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Abstract  
The editors of this volume highlight the role of intermediaries, alongside regulators and 
targets, as a way to better understand the outcomes of regulatory processes. Here, we explore 
the benefits of distinguishing a fourth category of actors: the groups whose interests the rules 
are meant to protect: the (intended) beneficiaries. We apply that framework to nonstate 
regulation of labor conditions, where the primary intended beneficiaries are workers and their 
families, especially in poorer countries. We first outline the different ways in which 
beneficiaries can relate to regulators, intermediaries, and targets; we then develop conjectures 
about the effect of different relationships on regulatory impacts and democratic legitimacy in 
relation to corporate power structures, specifically those embedded in the governance of 
global supply chains.  We illustrate these conjectures primarily with examples from three 
initiatives—Rugmark, the Fair Labor Association, and the Fairtrade system. We conclude 
that it matters whether and how beneficiaries are included in the regulatory process. 
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In exploring questions about regulatory power, legitimacy, and effectiveness, recent 
regulatory scholarship has placed particular emphasis on the identity of regulators (Abbott 
and Snidal 2009). Kenneth Abbott, David Levi-Faur, and Duncan Snidal (this volume) 
highlight the importance of also scrutinizing the identities and roles of intermediaries and 
targets of regulation. The dynamics through which targets and intermediaries engage with 
regulatory processes can play a crucial role in shaping key regulatory functions such as rule-
interpretation, monitoring compliance, and implementation (or evasion) of rules. The 
regulator-intermediary-target (RIT) framework that Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal developed 
indicates that interactions involving all three categories of regulatory actors have important 
potential implications not only for dynamics of power and accountability within regulatory 
systems but also for regulatory outcomes.1  
This article builds on the RIT framework to examine different modes of engagement 
in transnational regulatory processes by the groups whose interests the rules and policies are 
ostensibly meant to protect, and whose protection is often invoked to justify new forms of 
transnational regulation.2 For the sake of brevity, we call these actors intended beneficiaries, 
or just beneficiaries, although the question of whether they actually benefit from rules and 
regulations requires separate and careful analysis. It is entirely conceivable that a range of 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful to Kenneth Abbott, David Levi-Faur, and Duncan Snidal for being a generous source of 
inspiration and insight in the process of writing and revising this article. Many thanks also to Graeme Auld, 
Anna Holzscheiter, Felicity Vabulas, Stephan Rencken, an anonymous reviewer and the participants in the 
“Politics of Regulatory Intermediaries” workshop at the Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, May 2014; and the “Non-Governmental Organizations” panel at the 2015 International Studies 
annual convention. We remain responsible for the article’s shortcomings.   
2 On access by intended beneficiaries to transnational regulatory processes see, for instance, Dingwerth (2007), 
Chan and Pattberg (2008), Macdonald (2012). 
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actors involved in a regulatory scheme may benefit from it, but not the supposed 
beneficiaries. For instance, a scheme purportedly aimed at promoting labor standards in an 
industry may fail to improve the conditions of workers, but nevertheless shield participating 
companies from public criticism, assuage the conscience of consumers, absolve public 
authorities from taking remedial measures, or provide employment to scheme managers and 
auditors. The key point is that such benefits are contingent on the (valid or unfounded) claim 
that workers stand to benefit from the scheme. 
In some regulatory domains, such as consumers in the food safety systems that 
Havinga and Verbruggen (2017) analyze, beneficiaries are said to be “prominent by their 
absence.” In this article we analyze the varying modes of engagement through which 
intended beneficiaries of transnational regulation engage with regulatory processes, and 
identify some possible consequences of such engagement for processes and outcomes. We 
take Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal’s RIT framework as our reference point to explore how 
this model might be extended to focus on beneficiaries. In this way, we lay the groundwork 
for a descriptive typology of relationships between beneficiaries and each of the main 
categories of regulatory actors previously distinguished: regulators, intermediaries, and 
targets. We suggest that relationships between beneficiaries and the actors performing the 
regulatory roles of regulator, intermediary, and target can be usefully conceptualized as three 
broad types: separation, where regulatory actors are completely disconnected from 
beneficiaries; identity, where beneficiaries act directly as regulators, intermediaries, or 
targets; or representation, where regulators, intermediaries, or targets are said to represent 
beneficiaries.  The type of relationship that beneficiaries have with regulatory actors is 
important from at least two normative perspectives. From a welfarist perspective, such 
relationships can be an important determinant of the regulatory system’s effect on the welfare 
of beneficiaries, since they are likely to affect the content of regulations, their 
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implementation, and their outcomes. In short, who performs regulatory roles (and how) can 
affect what regulatory systems do, and what they do can affect the welfare of beneficiaries. 
From a democratic perspective, such relationships affect the degree to which people can gain 
control over their own fate through forms of collective self-rule. As has been argued at length 
elsewhere (Macdonald and Macdonald 2010), certain forms of power exercised by non-state 
actors affect in some problematic way the autonomy of individuals and therefore generate a 
normative need for their democratic control. Corporate power belongs in this category, 
including the power exercised within sectoral supply chain systems of production and trade 
across state borders. The entrenched importance of such transnational supply chain systems 
under conditions of sustained economic globalization makes the task of devising and 
realizing democratic control mechanisms particularly significant. While the welfarist 
perspective may lead analysts to attach an instrumental value to beneficiaries’ involvement in 
the regulatory processes, the democratic perspective is likely to stress the intrinsic value of 
such involvement. Participatory opportunities for beneficiaries may be considered an 
essential condition for legitimacy for two reasons: either because beneficiaries are subject to 
regulations, or because their interests are significantly affected by them. Further in this article 
we clarify this distinction and discuss its implications for the normative assessment of 
regulatory arrangements. 
Here we are mainly interested in nonstate regulation of labor conditions, where the 
key intended beneficiaries are workers and their families, especially in poor countries. Many 
prominent transnational regulatory initiatives present themselves as operating primarily to 
enhancw the welfare of such beneficiaries. Examining the role played by rule-intermediation 
is often particularly important in the domain of labor standards, since strong incentives to 
avoid compliance with certain regulations lead regulatory outcomes to be heavily dependent 
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on monitoring, certification, and other functions provided by intermediaries (Marx and 
Wouters 2017).  
Our analysis considers three transnational regulatory schemes: the Fair Labor 
Association (FLA), Fairtrade Labeling Organization (now called Fairtrade International; 
FLO), and Rugmark.3 Our examples are made up of snapshots taken at various points in time 
rather than exhaustive discussions of how the schemes have evolved (or not) over the years. 
There are two reasons why it is useful to consider together the relationships of 
beneficiaries with regulators, intermediaries and targets. First, the effect of a relationship on 
an outcome may depend on its interaction with another relationship. For instance, if the 
outcome of interest is rule compliance, beneficiary participation in rule-making may be 
complementary to beneficiary participation in rule monitoring, in that one amplifies the 
impact of the other. Such a conjecture is not obvious: one could also formulate the opposite 
conjecture: that they are substitutes, in that arrangements with either, but not both, lead to 
most compliance. We do not aim to formulate and assess specific conjectures about 
interaction effects in this article, though the possibility of such interactions suggests that a 
comprehensive view of the three relationships may be fruitful. 
The second reason it is useful to consider these relationships together is that different 
relationships may not emerge independently from one another, but co-evolve according to 
certain causal patterns. For instance, regulatory arrangements where beneficiaries are 
represented by regulators may have a propensity to develop monitoring mechanisms in which 
beneficiaries are represented by intermediaries; or, on the contrary, representation by 
regulators may result in separation from intermediaries as a result of the need for credibility. 
                                                          
3 Our analysis focuses on events up until 2009—before some participating organizations separated from Rugmark 
and formed a follow-up scheme called GoodWeave. 
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The possibility of such co-evolutionary dynamics also makes it useful to consider all three 
relationships within a common framework. Although we do not develop our analysis of such 
interactions in any depth, we consider such dynamics where they arise in the examples that 
we present.   
 
A General View of the Regulatory Process 
To systematically analyze the ways with which intended beneficiaries of transnational 
regulation engage regulatory processes, we begin by summarizing the roles of key actors in 
the regulatory process. Abbott, et al. (2017) offer a framework that provides a helpful starting 
point, by highlighting the importance in regulatory processes of targets and intermediaries, 
alongside regulators. Figure 1 provides a simple framework for conceptualizing how our 
analysis of beneficiaries can be connected to their analytical framework. The solid and 
dashed lines in Figure 1 illustrate six bilateral relationships. The dashed lines correspond to 
the three relationships at the center of Abbott, Levi-Faur and Snidal’s RIT framework: (i) 
between regulators and targets, (ii) between regulators and intermediaries, and (iii) between 
targets and intermediaries. The solid lines correspond to the relationships discussed in this 
article: (iv) between beneficiaries and targets, (v) between beneficiaries and regulators, and 




FIGURE 1 Beneficiaries in the Regulatory Triangle 
 
 
We suggest that the relationships between beneficiaries and the three regulatory roles 
can be of three types:  
1) Separation. At one extreme, regulators/intermediaries/targets are completely 
disconnected from beneficiaries.  
2) Identity.  At the other extreme, beneficiaries are the regulators/intermediaries/ 
targets within a specific regulatory arrangement. This conceptualization does not entail that 
they be the only regulators, intermediaries, or targets, or that all beneficiaries perform such 
roles.   
3) Representation. In this situation, beneficiaries are not themselves regulators, 
intermediaries, or targets, but ostensibly “represented” by them. Regulators, targets, or 
intermediaries somehow act on behalf of beneficiaries in such arrangements, although we 
stipulate that what it means to represent someone and how to evaluate the validity of 
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“representative claims” is the topic of a major debate in political philosophy and political 
science (Pitkin 1967, Rehfeld 2006, Urbinati and Warren 2008, Saward 2010). Here we limit 
ourselves to noting that some regulators, intermediaries, and targets advance at least 
minimally plausible claims to perform some representative function in relation to 
beneficiaries, whereas others do not state any such claim. We should also note that 
representation is often associated with a social relationship between two actors that is 
characterized by intense interaction, communication, and mutual understanding, but this is 
not always the case.4 
Table 1 summarizes the possible relationships defined in abstract terms. In ideal-
typical terms, rules can apply to actors with no connections to beneficiaries, to 
representatives of beneficiaries, or to beneficiaries (row 1); rules can be made by actors with 
no connections to beneficiaries, by representatives of beneficiaries, or by beneficiaries (row 
2); and key intermediary functions can be performed by actors with no connections to 
beneficiaries, by representatives of beneficiaries, or by beneficiaries (row 3). The next 
sections provide concrete illustrations.  
We should note that the boundaries between the columns—that is between 
beneficiaries and representatives, and between representatives and unconnected actors—can 
be fuzzy, and often evolve over time (Auld and Renckens 2017). For instance, labor unionists 
often are workers, but they also represent other workers. Moreover, some links between 
beneficiaries and representatives are clear and direct, such as explicit delegation of 
representative powers as a result of elections; while others are more indirect (and 
questionable). Some self-appointed “representatives” have such a tenuous link to 
beneficiaries that it is appropriate to regard them as unconnected actors. As with all ideal 
                                                          
4 See Koenig‐Archibugi and Macdonald (2013) for a discussion of the ways in which representatives can be related 
to beneficiaries in transnational nonstate governance arrangements.  
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types, Table 1 should be used as a heuristic device rather than as a map where actual cases 
can be unambiguously located. 
 
TABLE 1 Types of Relationships between Intended Beneficiaries and Regulators, 
Intermediaries and Targets 
Intended beneficiaries’ 
relationship with: 



















































Our discussion is limited in important ways. First, we focus on transnational rule-
making. This excludes from our purview the relationship between intended beneficiaries and 
regulators acting in a purely national or subnational capacity, such as the electoral 
accountability of legislators and executives responsible for national labor laws or links 
between trade unions and labor ministries. Second, we acknowledge that interactions between 
nonstate regulatory arrangements and state-centered (national and intergovernmental) 
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regulatory processes are very important, as shown in the recent literature on collaboration and 
orchestration (Abbott, et al. 2015). However, space constraints prevent us from analyzing 
them here. 
In the discussion that follows, we examine beneficiary engagement in regulatory 
processes of each category represented by the cells in Table 1—each row of which represents 
one functional component of the regulatory process. We first examine the different ways in 
which beneficiaries can be positioned in regulatory processes as targets. We then examine 
modes of engagement that beneficiaries can undertake in processes of regulatory rule-
making. This is followed by an examination of beneficiary engagement in rule 
intermediation, involving monitoring and compliance systems associated with transnational 
regulatory schemes. As the framework article by Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal (this volume) 
shows, monitoring and compliance are not the only functions performed by intermediaries, 
but we focus on this aspect because it is especially important in the domain of labor 
regulation. “Horizontal” movement along each row—from low to high levels of beneficiary 
participation—enables us to systematically consider the consequences for regulatory 
processes and outcomes of varying degrees of beneficiary inclusion at each functional stage 
(rule-making intermediation, and rule-taking). The “vertical” line of comparison between 
functional stages enables us to demonstrate the general point that beneficiary participation 
matters in processes of intermediation just as it does at other functional stages of the 
regulatory process. 
Our analysis of the effects of beneficiary participation on regulatory processes and 
outcomes is complicated by potential endogeneity of causal relationships, whereby the 
initiators of a regulatory scheme determine both the levels of beneficiary inclusiveness 
reflected in the scheme’s governance and the content of specific regulatory rules. Control by 
the scheme’s initiators over the level and the consequences of beneficiary inclusion over time 
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is, however, potentially limited in a number of ways. First, the decision to include 
beneficiaries can have long-term consequences on rule-making and intermediation that were 
not expected when the scheme was originally designed. Second, patterns of beneficiary 
inclusion may evolve over time in ways no regulatory actor can fully control. For example, 
decisions by regulators not to include beneficiaries may have unintended effects, such as 
greater efforts by NGOs to unilaterally undertake nondelegated intermediation functions. 
Moreover, changes in levels of beneficiary participation may be triggered by “exogenous 
shocks,” such as complaints, protests, or pressures to conform to evolving norms within a 
wider regulatory field. Auld, et al. (2015) note that private governance programs faced 
pressures to increase stakeholder involvement regardless of whether they were initially based 
on a “logic of control” (improving social outcomes by establishing strict and enforceable 
rules) or a “logic of empowerment” (reducing exclusion of marginalized actors in the global 
economy). We briefly mention examples of such dynamics below. Regardless of whether 
such dynamics actually unfold in particular cases, the fact that they are possible makes the 
counterfactual question meaningful: Would the content, application, and impact of rules be 
different if the level and type of involvement of beneficiaries had been different?  
 
Intended Beneficiaries and Targets 
Actors can be affected by a rule without being a target, while being a target implies being 
affected by the rule (though not necessarily through compliance with the rule). Intended 
beneficiaries are by definition meant to be affected by a regulatory arrangement. But being a 
target entails a specific form of affectedness, i.e., the rule is intended to restrict the range of 
possible courses of action available to those being regulated, either through prescribing or 
proscribing certain behaviors. In other words, rules constrain targets by addressing the 
behavior of these actors—imposing responsibilities on them, and thus limiting the choices 
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available to them. The constraining effect of rules can go hand in hand with an enabling or 
empowering effect. For example, a rule regarding the constitution of a worker organization 
can be enabling in the sense that it facilitates potentially empowering forms of collective 
action. At the same time, it can be restrictive in the sense that a given constitutive rule 
enables collective organization to occur in only one particular way, foreclosing other ways of 
organizing. Beneficiaries qualify as targets of regulation when their choices are somehow 
constrained, even if the enabling dimensions may be predominant.  
Among targets understood in this way, we distinguish between direct and indirect 
targets. Direct targets are those explicitly targeted by rules, and formally identified as holders 
of obligations and responsibilities in relevant documents, such as statutes, private contracts, 
licensing agreements, Memorandum of Understandings, and so on. Regulatory arrangements 
usually specify sanctions for noncompliance on the part of direct targets. By contrast, indirect 
targets are (intentionally or unintentionally) subject to constraints without this condition 
being explicitly stated and formalized. We call them indirect targets because for them the 
constraints typically result from compliance (or other rule-induced behavior) by the direct 
targets. For instance, a certification scheme may place formal obligations only on brands at 
the consumer end of global supply chains, but in reality (albeit implicitly) target also the 
practices of factories supplying those brands. 
We now consider in turn the three types of relationships between beneficiaries and 
targets depicted in the first row of Table 1: beneficiaries are distinct from targets, 
beneficiaries’ representatives are targets, and beneficiaries themselves are targets. We 
provide illustrative examples of each type of relationship as our analysis proceeds. As we 
illustrate, a given regulatory scheme can, and often does, encompass more than one type of 
relationship with beneficiaries. We conclude this section by discussing whether and how the 
type of relationship with beneficiaries matters. 
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Relationship of separation (cell 1A) 
Complete separation is relatively uncommon, since most nonstate regulatory 
arrangements include some rules that have intended beneficiaries as direct or indirect 
addressees. However, the extent to which such rules constrain beneficiaries varies 
significantly across regulatory arrangements. For instance, rules imposed on trading 
organizations within Fairtrade, especially long-term purchasing obligations, are intended to 
empower producer cooperatives and thus expand the options of both beneficiaries and their 
representatives (managers of cooperatives).  
 
Relationship of representation (cell 1B) 
The Fairtrade system also illustrates the second scenario in Table 1; that is, rules of a 
nonstate governance arrangement that constrain the representatives of beneficiaries. The 
system requires that Fairtrade products be purchased on a long-term basis from 
democratically governed worker or producer organizations. This requirement—a condition 
for participating in Fairtrade trading relationships—entails extensive obligations for 
participating producers in relation to the composition and governance of their collective 
organizations. These organizations are required to meet minimum standards regarding 
membership composition (a majority of small producer members being required in the case 
of cooperative production models), transparency, and democratic participation in 
organizational decision-making, and internal processes and training to facilitate producer or 
worker involvement, among other requirements. Such requirements affect farmers as well as 
their representatives. Fairtrade standards also impose obligations directly on small producer 
beneficiaries in relation to environmental management, labor conditions for contract workers, 




Relationship of identity (cell 1C) 
Regulatory arrangements in the labor standards field rarely identify individual 
workers or other beneficiaries as direct targets. There are some exceptions to this within the 
Fairtrade system, where many production standards for Small Producer Organizations are 
explicitly identified as also applying directly to individual producer members (one important 
category of Fairtrade beneficiaries).  
More commonly, however, workers and other beneficiaries can be understood as 
indirect targets. Consider the case of the Rugmark certification scheme, founded in 1994 as a 
result of a campaign against child labor in the Indian carpet industry conducted by Indian, 
German, British, and U.S. NGOs. Subsequently the initiative was extended to carpet 
production in Nepal and Pakistan. Rugmark standards consist of substantive rules concerning 
the use of child labor in carpet production and procedural rules concerning registration, 
inspection, and deregistration in case of noncompliance. The key direct targets of Rugmark 
rules are the exporters and manufacturers who sign license agreements with the Rugmark 
Foundation. If Rugmark inspectors repeatedly find illegal child labor in registered looms, the 
delinquent exporters lose permission to use the label. Carpet weavers, children actually or 
potentially working on looms, and their families are indirect targets. Rugmark-licensed 
exporters and traders are required not to purchase carpets from suppliers who employ 
children, or, if the child is a family member of the loom owner, if the child does not have 
evidence of regular school attendance. Whatever the welfare effect of such a requirement, it 
limits the options available to children and their families.  
 
Separation, representation, or identity in rule-taking: Does it matter? 
As noted in the introduction, the role of beneficiaries in regulatory systems can be 
normatively assessed from a welfarist or a democratic vantage point. In turn, different 
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approaches to democracy lead to different views about who should have participatory 
entitlements for a decision-making process to have democratic legitimacy. One influential 
view is that everyone who is significantly affected by a decision should have the right to 
participate in that decision (Goodin 2007, Fung 2013). While endorsed, in one form or 
another, by various prominent political theorists, this “all-affected principle” has also been 
subject to a great deal of scrutiny and criticism. Authors such as Abizadeh (2012, 12) prefer 
an alternative “all-subjected principle,” according to which all those who are subject to a 
coercive and symbolic political power should have a say in the terms of its exercise. 
In light of such debates, the question whether the intended beneficiaries of regulatory 
systems are targets matters considerably. From the perspective of the all-subjected principle, 
a democratic deficit emerges when targets are not also regulators. More specifically, 
participatory entitlements must be offered at least to targets that have not acquired this status 
voluntarily. The Rugmark case illustrates this situation: the decision to join the certification 
scheme is taken by the carpet exporters rather than by the loom workers, and loom workers 
can only disentangle themselves from Rugmark rules and inspections by re-negotiating or 
severing their relationship with the exporters and middle-men. Given the risks and costs 
involved in such an “exit” decision, it is plausible to conclude that at least some of 
Rugmark’s beneficiaries are coercively subject to it. Rugmark would then be democratically 
illegitimate if it did not offer beneficiaries a formal say in the content and implementation of 
its rules. In the following sections on rule-making and intermediation, we show that such a 
negative assessment appears well supported by the lack of participatory opportunities within 
the Rugmark system. 
If we endorse the all-affected principle, by contrast, the presence of coercion is not 
decisive. Beneficiaries do not need to be targets to have a valid claim to participation, as long 
as the regulatory system has (or might have) a significant impact on their interests. While the 
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all-subjected principle would lead us to treat the cases in cell 1A differently from those in cell 
1C, the all-affected principle would not. 
While the democratic yardstick produces a relatively clear picture of which regulatory 
processes are legitimate and which are not, the welfare implications of positioning 
beneficiaries as targets within a given regulatory arrangement are often ambiguous and highly 
context-dependent. Imposing constraining rules directly on beneficiaries can be costly for 
them, and may harm their welfare. For example, rules that constrain workers’ opportunities to 
generate extra income by working more than permitted hours of overtime, or to increase their 
perceived comfort during hard physical labor in hot conditions by not wearing protective 
equipment, might constrain worker welfare in certain dimensions, either in relation to 
individual workers or through externalities among them. Such rules may also have welfare-
enhancing consequences, when considered from the perspective of broader indicators of 
health or well-being. The “overall” impact on welfare is often unclear. 
 
Intended Beneficiaries and Regulators 
We turn next to the second row of Table 1, which identifies three modes of beneficiary 
engagement with regulators. Such relationships can range from the complete separation 
between beneficiaries and regulators, to the presence of some kind of “representative” in the 
rule-making process, to the provision of opportunities for beneficiaries to participate in the 
formal rule-making process. We provide illustrations for each of the three types and conclude 
the section by discussing whether and how the type of relationship matters. 
 
Relationship of separation (cell 2A) 
Rugmark is an example of separation between beneficiaries and regulators. There was no 
sustained effort to enable children to participate in determining what kind of program would 
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be in their best interest. Rugmark has been far from exploring all opportunities for involving 
working children in the design of its activities, especially if compared to the work of other 
organizations, such as Save the Children (Black 2004, Bourdillon, et al. 2010). Such neglect 
has also extended to parents and carers of the affected children. A survey of 5,545 workers on 
looms registered by Rugmark or other labeling schemes, or unregistered found that “villagers 
had little or no idea of the labeling programs initiated for tackling the problem of child labor 
in the carpet industry” (Sharma et al. 2000, 49). Similarly, a German evaluation team noted 
that Rugmark India never attempted to develop partnerships with its beneficiaries (Dietz, et 
al. 2003, 60). 
Although the separation between intended beneficiaries and regulators is not quite as 
stark as in Rugmark, intended beneficiaries of the Fair Labor Association (FLA) are able to 
exercise very little direct control over FLA managers. Structures of beneficiary representation 
within the FLA are very weak, and the FLA’s accountability to workers is further constrained 
by the limited knowledge possessed by many regarding the substance of FLA decisions, the 
procedures through which these decisions are made, and in many cases the very existence and 
purpose of the FLA.  
 
Relationship of representation (cell 2B) 
Formalized inclusion of beneficiaries in rule-making processes is much more common in 
representative structures. A clear example of beneficiary engagement through representative 
processes is offered by FLO. Although the majority of positions on the FLO board are still 
held by fair trade stakeholders from consuming rather than producing countries; delegates of 
fairtrade certified producer organizations hold four out of thirteen positions on the board. 
Moreover, producers have some direct representation on FLO’s Standards Committee, the 
body to which FLO’s standard-setting functions are delegated. Other members of this 
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committee are representatives of national initiatives, producers, traders, and other designated 
“experts.”  
Third-party organizations linked to beneficiaries also play important roles in rule-
making within the FLA. Modes of indirect beneficiary engagement occur quite differently in 
the FLA compared with the FLO. Beneficiaries are represented in FLO governance through 
formalized representative structures, in which beneficiaries are directly represented through 
their collective organizations. In the FLA, the individuals who speak in some sense “on 
behalf” of the interests of beneficiaries can represent these groups only indirectly or 
informally. The FLA board, which is responsible for setting the association’s strategic 
direction and overseeing its activities, is structured so that control is shared among 
companies, universities, and NGOs, each of which have six representatives on the board. 
Some NGO representatives aspire to speak for beneficiary concerns, though none claim to 
formally represent these groups.  
Informal engagement by representatives or advocates of beneficiary groups is also 
common. For example, representative organizations that we have elsewhere called 
“solidaristic proxies” (Koenig-Archibugi and Macdonald 2011) exercise important forms of 
influence over managerial decisions in FLO via their role in facilitating two-way information 
flows that connect beneficiaries with managers and enable deliberative processes of learning. 
Such learning processes have been facilitated in a number of ways. In the past, both the 
International Fair Trade Association (IFAT, now World Fair Trade Organization) and the fair 
trade alliance Network of European World Shops (NEWS) established global deliberative 
and communicative spaces involving fair trade groups, making use of transnational networks, 
newsletters, electronic updates, and commercial contacts to facilitate communication and 
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learning among beneficiaries, proxies, and managers.5 The links built between fair trade 
organizations and wider grassroots and activist groups at forums related to the World Trade 
Organization, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and Summit of the 
Americas have also been important in enabling the preferences of beneficiary groups to be 
communicated to managers.6 
 
Relationship of identity (cell 2C) 
Direct beneficiary participation in rule-making (as opposed to participation through 
representative structures) is rare in most nonstate governance schemes. In some cases this 
reflects a tendency to exclude beneficiaries from participation in the governance of 
transnational regulatory schemes altogether. For those schemes that recognize the value of 
beneficiary engagement in rule-making, it is perhaps not surprising that reliance tends to be 
placed on representative procedures, given that a large number of beneficiaries of most 
transnational regulatory schemes are geographically dispersed.  
There are some examples of direct beneficiary engagement in rule-making, in which 
ordinary worker or smallholder producers (not simply their organizational representatives) 
are given opportunities to have direct input into standard-setting processes. However, such 
channels are usually informal and/or ad hoc. 
Means through which beneficiaries can participate directly in FLO governance have 
been expanded in recent years. These include the introduction of an FLO Fairtrade Forum, 
which enables stakeholders to meet every two years; the creation of Regional Producer 
Assemblies, which meets regularly between forums to strengthen producer involvement; and, 
                                                          
5 Nicholls and Opal (2005, 254), citing Carol Wills from IFAT.  
6 See www.worldshops.org/FairTradeAdvocacy/FINEJun04.pdf. 
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in 2007, the granting of membership to three regional producer networks (Nicholls and Opal 
2005). Additionally, producers, together with traders, alternative trading organizations 
(ATOs) and other stakeholders, now serve on a Standards and Policy Working Group and a 
Certification Committee (Courville 2008).  
Although formal FLO rule-making relies heavily on a committee process that is 
remote from ordinary beneficiaries, formal opportunities for producer networks (among other 
stakeholders) to request reviews in areas of concern do exist,7 and the Standards Unit 
sometimes arranges additional consultation mechanisms such as stakeholder workshops to 
facilitate direct input from at least a small number of ordinary workers or producers.   
 
Separation, representation, or identity in rule-making: Does it matter? 
The preceding discussion highlighted different configurations of beneficiary 
engagement in rule-making. We now offer some preliminary illustrations of how such 
differences can influence regulatory processes and outcomes, specifically with regard to the 
content of rules and their welfare effects. For example, if the families in India’s carpet belt 
had been regulators in addition to targets, would the content of Rugmark’s rules have been 
different? And would such differences have brought about significant changes in the welfare 
of beneficiaries? The answer is probably yes to both questions.  
Interviews conducted by one of us with parents of (former) child laborers in the 
Indian carpet belt showed that their priorities were access to fee-free schools that offered 
teaching of sufficient quality (no teacher absenteeism); did not discriminate against poor and 
low-caste pupils; and provided midday meals, clothes, and school books. Parents also linked 





the end of child labor to provision of earning opportunities and financial help for the purchase 
of farm animals.8 Other researchers found that for villagers an improvement in school 
attendance depends on the establishment of schools at an accessible distance, regular teachers 
attendance, improved teacher-pupil ratios, and the provision of midday meals (Sharma et al. 
2000, 66). Parents stressed the link between the economic condition of households and school 
attendance (Sharma et al. 2000, 66). While parents supported the provision of schooling and 
income opportunities, they tended to oppose the prohibition and monitoring of children’s 
work (Sharma et al. 2000, 67).  
The Rugmark system provides some of the activities preferred by the beneficiaries. 
The Rugmark Foundation created a center for the rehabilitation of former bonded child 
laborers and nonresidential primary schools for children in carpet weaving areas. However, 
Rugmark provides no compensation to families for loss of income from child work and no 
alternative income opportunities (except some training for women in carpet weaving). 
Between 1997 and 2002, Rugmark India spent about half of its license fee income on 
monitoring and administration and the other half on social programs (Dietz 2003, 64). If the 
intended beneficiaries had been regulators, it is likely that a much greater proportion of the 
income would have been spent on schooling and income replacement. 
Conversely, the content of fair trade rules would have likely been significantly 
different had producers not had formal representation on the FLO board. Producers were not 
formally represented on the board when the organization was established in 1997, but reforms 
since that time have progressively strengthened their representation. Formal representation of 
beneficiaries proved to be crucial in helping producer representatives to secure an increase of 
                                                          
8 Interviews with sixty direct beneficiaries of child labor projects in villages of eastern Uttar Pradesh (Lokapur, 
Thakkarnagar, Birohi, Majhwan, and Katka), January 2005. 
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the minimum price for coffee and the social premium paid to producer groups in 2007, even 
with initial opposition from some managers of fair trade organizations in consuming 
countries (Bacon 2010, Reinecke 2010). 
Advocacy groups or other third party organizations linked to beneficiaries have also 
played an important role in shaping rule-making processes and outcomes in the FLA. 
Specifically, third party organizations have contributed to greater alignment between rule-
making processes and preferences of beneficiaries. To some extent, such organizations have 
been able to exert influence directly through the board, either via individual NGO board 
members, or via the indirect leverage that campus-based student activists have often been 
able to wield over university managers. More often, however, third party organizations have 
exercised influence over deliberative processes of feedback and learning among managers. 
Nevertheless, third-party organizations linked to beneficiaries have in many cases 
proven to have insufficient influence on managerial choices about some of the more overtly 
allocative instruments for which beneficiaries and solidaristic proxies have advocated. Of 
particular note, managers continued to resist demands for “living wages,” for the FLA to 
carry out programs to train workers, and for the FLA to participate in a proposed designated 
supplier program. 
 
Intended Beneficiaries and Intermediaries 
As discussed in the framework article of this volume, an intermediary can be understood as 
“any actor who acts in conjunction with a regulator to affect the behavior of a target” 
(Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal, this volume). In the following, we provide examples of 
complete separation between beneficiaries and intermediaries, “representatives” playing 
some rule-intermediary role, and direct involvement of beneficiaries in rule-intermediation. 
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As in the previous sections, we conclude by offering some thoughts on whether and how the 
type of relationship matters. 
 
Relationship of separation (cell 3A) 
Separation between beneficiaries and intermediaries is the predominant practice 
among nonstate governance schemes operating in the transnational labor regulation field. One 
clear illustration of such practices is offered by Rugmark. The Rugmark certification system 
is based on inspectors employed by Rugmark, who visit villages and loom sheds without 
advance warning. The Rugmark Foundation thus performs the roles of both regulator and 
intermediary. Researchers working in the carpet belt have noted that the families of working 
children tend to see the inspectors as outside forces threatening their means of livelihood. A 
team from the Institute for Human Development observed that “the manner in which these 
inspectors visit a specified loom is more in the nature of a raiding party,” with adult weavers 
being threatened with fines (Sharma, et al. 2000, 49). Another large-scale survey of 
households with children working in the carpet industry found that “NGOs working with 
government agencies for better enforcement are not well regarded by the villagers” 
(Srivastava and Raj 2002, 111).  
The relationship between beneficiaries and intermediaries is also characterized by 
high levels of separation in the FLA and FLO—both of which rely heavily on professional 
auditors. In the FLO, professional auditors operate through FLOCERT, an independent entity 
linked to the standard-setting organization. The FLA arranges for monitoring to be carried out 
both by professional compliance staff contracted by member companies, and by 
“independent” auditors arranged in a selection of facilities by the FLA Secretariat. 
Relationship of representation (cell 3B) 
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In the sphere of labor regulation, it is rare for transnational private regulatory schemes 
to rely heavily on intermediaries that have close relationships with beneficiaries (reflected in 
cell 3B of our table). It is particularly rare for the involvement of such groups to be 
formalized within the governance and compliance systems of these initiatives. Perhaps 
because of the orientation of many of these schemes toward providing assurance about 
production conditions to external audiences in consuming countries, processes of rule-
implementation and monitoring usually involve a central role for independent auditors. The 
trend highlighted by Van Der Heijden (2017) in relation to other policy domains also applies 
to labor: “regulation has become an industry in itself in which many regulatory intermediaries 
undertake business activities.” 
Nonetheless, there are some rather idiosyncratic examples of intermediaries that could 
be placed in the representative category. For example, the FLO has created FLO “liaison 
officers,” who are based in selected producing countries, and who work with plantation 
managers and small producers to help build their capacity to implement and comply with 
designated standards. Their focus is the fairtrade rules (plantation and cooperative managers), 
but they also have regular communication with worker “joint bodies” (the collective worker 
organizations operating on fairtrade certified plantations) and individual cooperative 
members. 
There are also examples of independent auditors that place relatively high value on 
strong communication and worker engagement in processes of monitoring. For example, the 
Guatemalan organization COVERCO (Commission for the Verification of Corporate Codes 
of Conduct) is a nonprofit consortium of individuals from Guatemalan civil society and 
relevant professions who provide independent code monitoring, and who have been 
contracted by the FLA in Guatemala on a number of occasions. They will only agree to carry 
out monitoring where factory management gives them full access to company records, and 
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allows them open access to factory locations over a period of months. They also insist on 
retaining the right to share the findings of their audits with other interested parties. Although 
they avoid any direct advocacy role for workers, to maintain their independence, their degree 
of “closeness” to workers is much greater than is usually the case for auditors of this kind. 
Another example of an auditing system that facilitates extensive input from beneficiaries into 
audit processes is the Fair Wear Foundation, described by Marx and Wouters (this volume).  
There are also examples in which outside advocacy groups, which aspire to speak on 
behalf of beneficiaries, have undertaken monitoring or compliance activities. Adversarial 
outside groups such as the Workers Rights Consortium (WRC) or United Students Against 
Sweatshops (USAS) are examples. There are also similar examples from other regulatory 
schemes—such as the role of the Dutch NGO SOMO in initiating its own investigations into 
compliance with Rainforest Alliance standards by tea producers in India and Kenya, or the 
UK based Forest Peoples Programme conducting independent investigations of producer 
compliance with Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil standards in Indonesia. Each of these 
examples illustrates how advocacy organizations external to a regulatory scheme can 
investigate or monitor compliance with the scheme’s stipulated rules (thus performing rule-
intermediation functions), albeit through informal or ad hoc processes. 
 
Relationship of identity (cell 3C)  
In some cases, beneficiaries of nonstate governance arrangements can be considered 
intermediaries, as defined by Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal (this volume). Direct beneficiary 
involvement in intermediation is most commonly associated with fire-alarm monitoring 
systems. The FLA has established a third-party complaint mechanism that enables 
beneficiaries to make formal complaints to the FLA Secretariat in the case of alleged 
violations of FLA rules. FLOCERT similarly offers a procedure whereby beneficiaries or 
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their representatives may make formal “accusations” against certified fairtrade operators 
alleged to have violated fairtrade standards or policies.9   
Another example of a fire-alarm monitoring mechanism is the Clean Clothes 
Campaign (CCC), specifically its Urgent Appeals (UA) system, created in the mid-1990s 
(den Hond, et al. 2014). The CCC itself has the characteristics of a regulator, in the sense that 
it decides which actions by factory owners and managers qualify as violation of core labor 
rights and deserve to be subject to transnational pressure. Factory owners and managers are 
targets; although the CCC is not based on their voluntarily accepting a set of rules to which 
they can be held to account. Workers themselves, in conjunction with local trade unions and 
NGOs, function as intermediaries, in the sense that it is up to workers to trigger the procedure 
by requesting help from the CCC and providing information on alleged labor rights 
violations.  
 
Separation, representation, or identity in rule-intermediation: Does it matter? 
While we cannot offer a systematic review of all the available evidence, there are 
good reasons to believe that beneficiaries’ relationships to intermediaries affect the 
interpretation and implementation of rules, and that this has potential implications both for 
the welfare of beneficiaries and for regulatory outcomes.  
Of particular relevance is a long-standing controversy over the relative merits of 
monitoring compliance through professional auditing companies, as opposed to worker-based 
mechanisms, such as the CCC’s urgent appeal system or the procedures used by the Workers’ 
Rights Consortium (WCR) (Esbenshade 2004). Mark Anner has recently shown how the 
relationship between beneficiaries and intermediaries in the FLA matters for the outcome of 
                                                          
9 See http://www.flocert.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/QM-Complaints-SOP-14-en.pdf.  
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monitoring processes. On the basis of an analysis of all 805 factory audits conducted by the 
FLA between 2002 and 2010, Anner (2012) maintains that violations in areas such as 
minimum wages, hours of work, and health and safety are much more frequently detected 
than violations of freedom of association (FoA) rights.  
Anner makes two interesting comparisons. One is a comparison between FLA audits 
and a different procedure available in the FLA system, the third-party complaint mechanism. 
The FLA investigated nineteen third-party complaints between 2002 and 2010, and the single 
greatest issue-area in these complaints was FoA (32 percent of all violations, as opposed to 5 
percent of violations detected by FLA audits). Anner notes that the higher proportion of FoA 
violations detected following third-party complaints suggests that “when worker 
representatives and their activist allies take the initiative, they are more likely to detect 
violations of the empowering rights embodied in FoA” (Anner 2012, 621). The other 
comparison is between the findings of FLA auditors and those of inspections by the WRC, 
whose strategy is to encourage workers to present complaints and then investigate them. 
Anner finds that the WRC is six times more likely to find FoA violations in factories than the 
FLA, compared to other types of violations. This is strong evidence that it matters whether 
and how the monitors are connected to beneficiaries.  
Furthermore, as Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal (this volume) indicate, RIT 
relationships are subject to the risk of capture of intermediaries by targets, most crudely in the 
form of bribes to monitors to prevent the reporting of rule violations, or as a result of 
competition between intermediaries to secure targets as their clients (Galland 2017, van der 
Heijden 2017). It is plausible that beneficiary involvement in monitoring activities can make 




Interactions between Relationships 
In the previous sections we asked whether it matters what kind of relationship (identity, 
representation, separation) there is between beneficiaries and each of the three regulatory 
actors taken separately, in terms of democratic legitimacy, the content of rules and their 
implementation, and consequences for beneficiary welfare and regulatory impacts. However, 
these relationships often interact, and thus the effects of any one of them often depend on 
how the others are configured.  
We can observe first the possibility that beneficiaries’ relationship to regulators 
affects the interpretation or application of rules. Consider the interpretation that Anner (2012) 
makes, summarized in the previous section. He explains that the FLA auditing system results 
in a low proportion of detected FoA violations, lower than the FLA’s third-party complaint 
mechanism as well as the WRC system, not just in terms of who does what at the factory 
level. Anner also argues that “corporate-influenced programs will be more likely to 
emphasize monitoring minimal labor standards (minimum wages, hours of work, health and 
safety) to increase their legitimacy, but will be less likely to emphasize the monitoring and 
remediation of FoA rights since these rights are perceived to lessen managerial control” 
(Anner 2012, 612). According to Anner, rule-intermediation in the FLA and in the WRC 
system generates different outcomes because of the influence exercised by different 
stakeholders on the regulatory arrangement as a whole.  
This evidence is directly relevant to the issue of interaction, because (to repeat) the 
neglect of FoA rights is not located in the rules themselves, but in the activities of the 
intermediaries, i.e., the FLA auditors, and in Anner’s view this ultimately results from the 
fact that workers are neither present nor effectively represented in the FLA’s decision-making 
process. But this conclusion is not obvious, and the issue deserves further analysis based on a 
comparison of other nonstate regulatory arrangements. 
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Beneficiaries’ relationships to intermediaries may also affect the making of rules, as 
well as associated policies about rule-intermediation procedures, through indirect feedback 
processes. As we have seen, there are few examples of direct beneficiary participation in rule-
intermediation beyond ad hoc or informal instances of engagement, and as Auld and 
Renckens (this volume) emphasize, the investigation and monitoring functions performed by 
beneficiaries can sometimes be difficult to differentiate from influencing efforts external to 
the regulatory process. Nonetheless, where such beneficiary engagement has occurred, the 
capacity for investigation or monitoring procedures to highlight systemic failures in 
regulatory regimes has sometimes created pressure to change the rules. For example, 
independent auditing reforms in the FLA, as well as the introduction of regulatory initiatives 
to tackle pervasive problems, such as discrimination or FoA violations, can be linked to 
sustained pressure from external investigation and monitoring, in addition to internal 
processes.  
As we also illustrated above, positioning beneficiaries as targets can involve complex 
considerations of the trade-offs between conflicting welfare effects. Moreover, welfare 
effects may depend not only on the content of rules (such as those concerning overtime limits 
or the wearing of protective equipment), but also on subtle questions about how such rules 
are implemented. In such situations, enabling beneficiaries to have input into rule-making 
may be an important means of enabling difficult trade-offs to be made in ways that are 
consistent with beneficiary welfare (or at least beneficiaries’ own perceptions of their 
welfare). In other words, the welfare effects of the rule-taking status of beneficiaries are 





We have argued that the participation of beneficiaries in transnational regulatory processes 
can “matter,” in that it influences what rules are made, in whose interests, and how these 
rules are interpreted and implemented. This is important for the welfare effects of regulatory 
systems, for conformity with democratic principles, and for regulatory outcomes. 
By definition, (intended) beneficiaries are (meant to be) affected by processes of rule-
making and intermediation irrespective of whether they are formally identified as targets. 
Even where workers or small producers are not direct addressees of transnational regulation, 
rules addressing employers (or other relevant supply chain actors) are supposed to have, and 
often actually have, significant welfare implications for workers or small producers (though 
not always the welfare effects that were intended by regulators). How they are affected 
depends importantly on the character of their engagement with regulatory processes; that is 
whether their relationship with rule-making and intermediation is characterized by identity, 
representation, or separation. 
We have also suggested that the degree of participation or representation that 
beneficiaries have in regulatory processes can have significant welfare implications for 
beneficiaries at each functional stage of the regulatory process. These stages are connected in 
important ways, so that participation or representation at one level has direct welfare 
implications at that regulatory stage as well as spillover effects for welfare effects produced 
at other stages. Nevertheless, there is some degree of autonomy of processes at different 
levels, so participation or representation at one level cannot substitute for participation or 
representation at other levels. If beneficiaries are to be in a position to protect their own 
interests within transnational regulatory processes, opportunities for direct participation 
and/or indirect representation is likely to be required both in rule making processes and in 
processes of monitoring and auditing. 
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While we have reached the general conclusion that beneficiary participation in the 
regulatory process matters, further investigation is needed to ascertain which constellations of 
conditions are likely to produce which outcomes. We conclude by highlighting some 
promising avenues for future research.  
First, research could explore potential contributions of beneficiaries to regulatory 
functioning, for example by providing unique sources of expertise regarding “on the ground” 
target behavior, mitigating risks of intermediary capture by countering potential 
misinformation provided by targets to intermediaries about their own compliance, or 
countering arguments made by targets to regulators about the kinds of rules and 
implementation processes that can be considered feasible or appropriate in a given 
sociopolitical context (such as occupational health and safety standards or levels of “living 
wages”). 
Second, and relatedly, future research could examine how differences among 
beneficiaries mediate the impact of participatory mechanisms. Participation may yield 
different results depending on whether beneficiaries possess high or low organizational and 
epistemic capacities—shaping their ability to gather and communicate information about 
target performance in forms acceptable to regulatory authorities. For example, are there 
systematic differences in how unionized workers and illiterate families of working children 
contribute to processes of regulatory intermediation?  
Third, as noted in the introduction to this article, we have provided a series of 
snapshots to illustrate different types of relationships, but analysis of how these relationships 
have evolved in the context of institutional and other changes would be a valuable extension 
(Auld 2014 , Auld, et al. 2015). The dynamic aspect deserves further attention because the 
transnational regulatory schemes considered here operate in a complex policy field, 
characterized by high levels of interaction among individual schemes (Fransen 2011, 
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Macdonald 2013), with the potential for both diffusion and differentiation among initiatives 
in relation to modes of beneficiary involvement.  
Finally, this article focused on one policy domain—the regulation of labor 
conditions—where the identification of beneficiaries, while not exactly straightforward, is 
arguably easier than in other regulatory domains. In environmental policy, for instance, often 
the intended benefits have more clearly the character of (global) public goods. To what extent 
our conclusions extend to other policy domains is another worthwhile topic for further 
research. For instance, in her application of the RIT framework to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), De Silva (2017) volume) highlights the fact that the court, as primary 
intermediary, delegates regulatory functions to, or orchestrates, NGOs, which thus acquire 
the role of “secondary intermediaries.” If we extended our argument to the domain of 
international criminal justice and considered the victims of atrocities as a key beneficiary 
group, we would expect to find that the type of relationship between these NGOs and victims 
(separation, representation, and victims as NGO members) matters for both the process and 
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